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Emerging and re-emerging zoonotic viral diseases are major threats to global health, eco-
nomic stability, and national security. Vaccines are key for reducing coronaviral disease
burden; however, the utility of live-attenuated vaccines is limited by risks of reversion or
repair. Because of their history of emergence events due to their prevalence in zoonotic pools,
designing live-attenuated coronavirus vaccines that can be rapidly and broadly implemented
is essential for outbreak preparedness. Here, we show that coronaviruses with completely
rewired transcription regulatory networks (TRNs) are effective vaccines against SARS-CoV.
The TRN-rewired viruses are attenuated and protect against lethal SARS-CoV challenge.
While a 3-nt rewired TRN reverts via second-site mutation upon serial passage, a 7-nt
rewired TRN is more stable, suggesting that a more extensively rewired TRN might be
essential for avoiding growth selection. In summary, rewiring the TRN is a feasible strategy
for limiting reversion in an effective live-attenuated coronavirus vaccine candidate that is
potentially portable across the Nidovirales order.
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Emerging and re-emerging zoonotic viral diseases are majorthreats to global human health, economic stability, andnational security1–6. The incidence of human zoonotic
disease is estimated to surpass 1 billion cases per year, with novel
emerging infectious diseases accruing hundreds of billions of
dollars in economic losses7,8, losses that are greatly magnified
when new emerging viruses such as coronaviruses (CoVs)
devastate economically critical livestock populations across the
globe. With the continued encroachment of human populations
into animal habitats and our close contact with domesticated
animals, zoonoses will continue to increase as the human and
livestock population numbers and density expand over the next
century. In fact, a recent study recognized that the majority of
emerging infectious disease events have origins in wildlife3,8,
underscoring the importance of developing broadly applicable
strategies for vaccine design for virus families that are harbored
within extensive zoonotic pools.
Vaccines are well established in their capacity to reduce viral
disease burden. Live-attenuated vaccines, because they can elicit
balanced innate and adaptive—and often lifelong—protective
immune responses, including lactogenic immunity, are ideal
candidates for vaccine development in humans and animals1.
However, their utility as broadly applicable vaccine platforms has
long been limited by risks of reversion of attenuated vaccine
strains to virulence, largely because the stability of the attenuation
cannot be clearly evaluated or assured.
The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Cor-
onavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the 21st century emphasizes the
threat of pandemic viral infections originating from cross-species
transmission events9–11. These highly pathogenic variants are
prime models for the development of broad-based strategies for
evaluating live virus vaccines for the Nidovirales order. Cor-
onaviruses (CoVs) all reproduce with conserved replication
strategies, emphasizing the strength and rapidly adaptable
potential of a vaccine design platform that takes advantage of this
biology. CoVs replicate and transcribe subgenomic RNAs
(sgRNAs) via a discontinuous transcription mechanism mediated
by transcription regulatory sequences (TRSs), a series of con-
served nucleotide sequences positioned near the 5′-end of the
genome and at several locations immediately 5′ of each down-
stream open reading frame (ORF) (Fig. 1). These TRSs regulate a
transcription attenuation program via base-pairing interactions
between the leader TRS and body TRSs that results in the pro-
duction of sgRNAs, from which downstream ORFs are translated.
Within the TRS, a 6- to 8-nt core sequence (ACGAAC for SARS-
CoV) guides base-pairing and duplex formation between nascent
RNA and the leader TRS12–14. While this collective TRS
arrangement, the transcription regulatory network (TRN), is
conserved, our laboratory has shown that it is possible to rewire
the guide sequence of the SARS-CoV TRN and produce infec-
tious virus13. We also showed that recombination between this
rewired TRN virus and wild-type (WT) SARS-CoV was not
viable, indicating that recombination-mediated reversion of a
CoV vaccine platform featuring a rewired TRN is highly unlikely.
Based on conservation of the TRN biology across CoVs, this
report further explores the feasibility of the development of a
stably attenuated vaccine platform featuring a completely rewired
TRN as a candidate strategy for a broadly applicable, rapidly
implementable CoV vaccine platform that is highly resistant to
recombination repair and stably attenuated in both young and
highly vulnerable mouse models of human disease.
Results
The 3-nt TRN mutant is attenuated for virulence. In a previous
study in our laboratory, we demonstrated that the SARS-CoV
TRN could be reprogrammed, provided the individual TRSs were
replaced with matching sequences13. The rewired TRN replaced
the conserved 6-nt TRS with a 6-nt cassette that is not used in any
other characterized CoVs, encoding a net change of 3 nts
(ACGAAC to CCGGAU). Our previous work showed that this
rewired TRN was refractory to recombination with WT gen-
omes13. Therefore, we tested its replication and pathogenesis in
young and aged BALB/c mice. Consistent with earlier reports,
WT SARS-CoV only caused weight loss in aged animals. In
contrast, CRG3 replicated but caused no weight loss in young
(10-week-old) mice (Fig. 2a) and minimal weight loss in aged (12-
month-old) BALB/c mice (Fig. 2b) (young mice: P= 0.25 for
titer, Wilcoxon test, P= 0.37 for weight loss, Mann-Whitney test;
old mice: P= 0.25 for titer, P < 0.001 for weight loss). Both WT
and recombinant viruses replicated to high titers that were
detectable on days 2 and 4 post-infection (p.i.) in both young and
aged animals, with titers beginning to clear by day 7 p.i. (Fig. 2c,
d), as is usually observed in mice infected with SARS-CoV1.
Vaccination with CRG3 protects mice against challenge. The
high replication titer and low or absent virulence in young and
aged mouse models paired with the inherently recombination-
refractory genome suggested that the CRG3 virus would be an
ideal vaccine candidate. To test CRG3’s efficacy in protecting
against homologous and heterologous challenge, the virus was
administered to mice in a single-dose vaccination, alongside viral
replicon particles (VRPs) expressing the viral Spike attachment
protein (VRP-S) as a control15. On day 22 post-vaccination, mice
were then challenged with either mouse-adapted SARS-CoV
(MA15—homologous challenge) or SARS-CoV expressing the
Spike gene from the Himalayan palm civet (Paguma larvata)
strain HCSZ6103 (heterologous challenge). Mice were then
observed for morbidity and mortality, and surviving animals were
euthanized on day 4 p.i. Upon homologous challenge, CRG
vaccination was protective against weight loss and mortality in
young and aged mice, with no detectable viral titer in the lungs at
4 days p.i., in contrast to PBS and VRP-S subcutaneous vacci-
nation (Fig. 3a–d, Supplementary Fig. 1A-B). Importantly, against
heterologous challenge, while both CRG3 and VRP-S vaccines
SARS-CoV WT TRS (ACGAAC)
SARS-CoV CRG3 TRS (CCGGAU)













Fig. 1 Schematic of the rewired TRN SARS-CoV mutants. The SARS-CoV genome is depicted, with open reading frames (ORFs) indicated. The locations of
mouse-adapted mutations are denoted by black triangles. The location of each characterized TRS is denoted by a red box. The specific TRS core sequences
are listed underneath the genome
were protective in young mice, only CRG3 was protective in aged
mice against replication and mortality, with no detectable titer in
the lungs at 4 days p.i. (Fig. 3e–h, Supplementary Fig. 1C–D).
CRG vaccination induced SARS-CoV neutralizing antibody titers
approaching 4 log10 in both young and aged mice, nearly 2-fold
higher than the titers induced by VRP-S vaccination (P < 0.0001,
two-way ANOVA) (Supplementary Fig. 1E). Moreover, CRG
vaccination largely protected aged mice from the extensive
inflammatory cell infiltration, tissue damage, perivascular cuffing,
edema, and septal thickening observed in PBS- and VRP-S-
vaccinated mice (Supplementary Fig. 2).
CRG3 reverts with pandemic-associated mutations. A live-
attenuated vaccine candidate should demonstrate phenotypic
stability in infected host populations. Therefore, to test its resis-
tance to reversion to virulence, CRG3 was subjected to five
independent serial passages in parallel with WT SARS-CoV in
aged (14-month-old) BALB/c mice. Over the course of six 4-day
passages, all CRG3 passaged viruses acquired a virulent pheno-
type, with weight losses and percent survival curves mirroring the
kinetic rates of the emergence of virulence seen with WT pas-
saged viruses (Supplementary Fig. 3). To attempt to identify the
genotypic causes of this phenotypic reversion to virulence, the
genomes of 5 independent plaque isolates of the passage 6 viruses
(WT P6 and CRG3 P6) were submitted to Sanger sequencing.
Surprisingly, and contrary to expectations, no mutations in either
the Spike or the Membrane protein—both of which were targets
for mutational selection in 3 separate adaptations of SARS-CoV
Urbani to mice (Fig. 4a)—were identified in WT or CRG3
revertants. Instead, 4 of 5 CRG3 P6 isolates showed evidence
of often large deletions in the accessory ORFs 7b, 8a, and 8b
(Fig. 4a, b). These deletions, often in-frame, were reminiscent of
several incidences of host range-associated deletions identified in
human isolates from the 2003 SARS-CoV epidemic, including a
29-nt deletion in ORF8 relative to the Himalayan palm civet
strain16 and 82-nt17 and 386-nt18 deletions in this same region. In
contrast, deletions in accessory ORFs were rare in virulent WT
revertants. Rather, scattered nonsynonymous mutations were
identified in ORF1a, ORF3a, ORF8a, and ORF9. Notably, only
1 WT revertant exhibited a small deletion in ORF7b. Collectively,
these findings demonstrated that this region of the SARS-CoV
genome is inherently unstable when subjected to replication
pressure, especially in aged animals, and indicated that a TRN-
rewired virus would require additional stabilizing mutations to be
feasible as a vaccine candidate.
An attenuated SARS-CoV mutant with a 7-nt TRN replacement.
The demonstration of second-site reversion to virulence upon
passage of CRG3 suggested that a more ideal TRN-rewired vac-
cine candidate would be one that would be less likely to pheno-
typically revert in vivo. CoV TRS networks are finely tuned and
regulate the expression of both highly abundant and low-
frequency mRNA transcripts; thus, small changes in the TRS
might subtly alter the regulation of subgenomic transcripts13.
Moreover, the exact regulatory milieu around each TRS is
uncertain beyond the recognition that both, up- and downstream
sequences can influence mRNA expression efficiency, perhaps in
a TRN sequence-specific manner19,20. We hypothesized that
more extensive remodeling of the TRS network may better dis-
rupt the finely tuned network of abundant and low-frequency
transcripts, altering the natural regulation of global gene
expression, and thereby leading to decreased virulence. In addi-
tion, it was possible that the virulence observed in CRG3 P6
isolates was due, at least in part, to mouse adaptation during
passage. Therefore, to evaluate the effects of more extensive TRN
rewiring in a lethal pathogenic model and to further stabilize the
TRN against recombination repair and mutation selection, a TRN













































































































Fig. 2 In vivo characterization of the SARS-CoV CRG3 mutant. a, bWeight loss is depicted as percent initial mass in (a) young and (b) aged mice. c, d Viral
replication in the lungs is depicted as titer (log10 PFU/g) in (c) young and (d) aged BALB/c mice. Viruses: WT, red diamonds; CRG3, blue triangles. Dashed
lines: limits of detection. Error bars depict standard deviation
6 mouse-adapted mutations present in the SARS-MA15 virus (see
Fig. 4a); and (2) a newly designed TRN consisting of a 7-nt
complete replacement of the 9 SARS-CoV TRS loci (ACGAAC to
UGGUCGC – CRG7-MA – Fig. 1). These replacements yielded
infectious CRG7-MA virus that was capable of replicating to titers
equivalent to those of the mouse-adapted WT background virus,
SARS-MA15, though with a pinpoint plaque phenotype that
remained stable after tissue culture passage. CRG3-MA (9 CRG3
replacements in the virulent SARS-MA15 backbone) was also
generated as a control TRN-rewired virus. northern blot analysis
of CRG7-MA versus CRG3 and SARS-MA15 revealed that the
virus produced the expected bands at similar proportions to WT
virus, although some additional low-abundance transcripts were
also noted in CRG7-MA (Supplementary Fig. 4).
These viruses were then evaluated for replication and virulence
in young (10-week-old) and aged (12-month-old) BALB/c mice
in comparison with SARS-MA15. In young mice, CRG7-MA was
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Fig. 3 Vaccination of young and aged mice with SARS-CoV CRG3. (a, c, e, g) Weight loss upon homologous (a, c) and heterologous (e, g) challenge is
depicted as percent initial mass in young (a, e) and aged (c, g) vaccinated BALB/c mice. b, d, f, h Viral replication in the lungs upon homologous (b, d) and
heterologous (f, h) challenge is depicted as titer (log10 PFU/g) in (b, f) young and (d, h) aged vaccinated BALB/c mice. Vaccinations: black circles, PBS
vaccination; orange squares, VRP-S vaccination; blue triangles, CRG3 vaccination. Dashed lines: limits of detection. Error bars depict standard deviation
a weight loss of ~5% (P < 0.0001, t test, on days 2–5 p.i. for
CRG7-MA vs. CRG3-MA), though replicating to high titers
(approximately 7 log10 PFU for CRG7-MA vs. 8 log10 PFU for
CRG3-MA and SARS-MA15) at 2 days p.i. Further, CRG7-MA
showed evidence of more rapid clearance kinetics, with a nearly
3-log10 difference in titer compared with the CRG3-MA and
SARS-MA15 controls at 4 days p.i. (Fig. 5a–c) (P < 0.001, t test,
for both 2 and 4 days p.i. for CRG3-MA vs CRG7-MA). While
morbidity and mortality were more pronounced in old mice,
CRG7-MA was still attenuated compared with CRG3-MA and
SARS-MA15 in terms of weight loss (less weight loss on days 2–4
p.i., P < 0.05 on days 2 and 4 p.i., t test, CRG3-MA vs. CRG7-mA)
and lung titer (8 log10 PFU for CRG7-MA vs. >9 log10 PFU for
CRG3-MA and SARS-MA15 on day 2 p.i. (P < 0.0001, t test,
CRG3-MA vs. CRG7-MA); ~2.5-log10 PFU difference in titer on
day 4 p.i. (P < 0.05, t test, CRG3-MA vs. CRG7-MA) (Fig. 5d–f).
Infection of aged BALB/c mice with 2 log10, 3 log10, or 4 log10
PFU of CRG7-MA or SARS-MA15 emphasized the attenuated
virulence phenotype, with the 2-log10 PFU infection of CRG7-
MA causing almost no weight loss over the course of the
infection, despite replicating to the same titers as the 3 log10 and 4
log10 PFU infections (Fig. 5g–h). Under identical conditions,
SARS-MA15 mice lost more body weight (>20%) and experi-
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Fig. 4 Accumulation of second-site mutations upon passage of SARS-CoV CRG3. a The SARS-CoV genome is depicted at the top. The mutations identified
in the 3 published mouse-adapted SARS-CoV genomes (MA15, MA20, and MA25) are shown in the top 3 yellow sections immediately below the genome.
The mutations identified via Sanger sequencing in 5 individual plaque isolates of WT SARS-CoV and CRG3 after 6 passages (WT P6 and CRG3 P6,
respectively) are depicted in the bottom 2 yellow sections. Nonsynonymous mutations that led to amino acid substitutions are identified by their WT
amino acid residue, the residue number in the mature protein, and the substituted residue. b The genome bounds of the SARS-CoV ORF 7a, 7b, 8a, and 8b
accessory proteins are denoted. Individual rows indicate each of 5 plaque isolates from WT SARS-CoV after 6 passages (WT P6) and CRG3 after 6
passages (CRG3 P6). Deletions are indicated with black boxes in each row, with the bounds of the deletions specified
between CRG7-MA and SARS-MA15 infections, with 100% of
mice infected with 2 log10 or 3 log10 PFU and 60% of mice
infected with 4 log10 PFU surviving the course of CRG7-MA
infection. In contrast, only 40% of mice infected with 2 log10 PFU
of SARS-MA15 survived infection; mice infected with 3 log10 or 4
log10 PFU survived only until days 6 or 3 p.i. maximum,
respectively (P < 0.0001, log-rank test) (Fig. 5i). When CRG7-MA
was serially passaged in young (10-week-old) BALB/c mice, in
contrast to the rapid phenotypic reversion observed with CRG3,
CRG7-MA remained phenotypically stable with passage, with
mice losing a minimal (~5%) amount of their starting weight over
the 3-day infections throughout all 4 passages (Supplementary
Fig. 5A). Viral titer also remained stable over passage, with >5
log10 PFU detectable at 3 days p.i. in each passage (Supplemen-
tary Fig. 5B). Furthermore, when CRG7-MA was serially passaged
independently three times for six passages in aged mice,
replicating the passage conditions in which CRG3 reverted to
virulence, CRG7-MA did not exhibit an increase in virulence,
causing <20% weight loss in infected animals and ~60% mortality
upon infection of 12-month-old BALB/c mice with 105 PFU of
CRG7-MA post-passage, essentially replicating the mortality
shown in aged mice infected with non-passaged CRG7-MA virus
and distinct from the 100% mortality caused by wild-type
SARS-MA15 infection of aged mice (see Fig. 5i, Supplementary
Fig. 5C-D, and Supplementary Table 1).
Finally, CRG7-MA was evaluated for its capacity to protect
against lethal SARS-MA15 challenge in aged (12-month-old)
mice. Mice were vaccinated with 2.5 log10 PFU of either CRG7-
MA or ExoN-MA, which we previously demonstrated to be an
effective vaccine in the SARS-MA15 backbone in the aged BALB/
c mouse model of SARS-CoV pathogenesis1. On day 22 post-
vaccination, mice were then challenged with a lethal dose (5 log10
PFU) of SARS-MA15 and evaluated for weight loss. Mice lost
only minimal amounts (~5%) of their starting weights with both
vaccines (P= 0.125 for both viruses versus PBS vaccination,
Wilcoxon test), indicating that CRG7-MA and ExoN-MA were
equally protective against lethal SARS-MA15 challenge (Fig. 6).
Discussion
Live-attenuated vaccines remain key players in reducing the
global disease burden associated with viral infections in humans,
critically important livestock, and companion animals. Histori-
cally and contemporarily, live-attenuated vaccines have been used
with success to help control measles, mumps, rubella, polio,
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Fig. 5 In vivo characterization of the SARS-CoV CRG7-MA mutant. a, d Weight loss is depicted as percent initial mass in (a) young and (d) aged BALB/c
mice. b, e Viral replication in the lungs is depicted as titer (log10 PFU/g) in (b) young and (e) aged BALB/c mice. Black circles: PBS; red diamonds: SARS-
MA; blue triangles: CRG3-MA; purple circles: CRG7-MA. c, fMortality is depicted as percent survival in (c) young and (f) aged mice. Black: PBS; red: SARS-
MA; blue: CRG3-MA; purple: CRG7-MA. g–i Dose-dependent pathogenicity of SARS-CoV CRG7-MA. Aged BALB/c mice were infected with SARS-CoV
CRG7-MA and were evaluated for (g) weight loss, depicted as percent initial mass, (h) viral replication in the lungs, depicted as titer (log10 PFU/g), and (i)
mortality, depicted as percent survival. Red: SARS-MA; purple: CRG7-MA; unfilled symbols: 2-log10 infection; starred symbols: 3-log10 infection; solid
symbols: 4-log10 infection. Dashed lines: limits of detection. Error bars depict standard deviation (a, b, d, e, h) or standard error of the mean (g)
However, live-attenuated vaccines are also associated with the risk
of reversion by either mutation- or recombination-driven pro-
cesses, which can cause dangerous outbreaks in unvaccinated
populations, including animals22. For example, highly pathogenic
porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) strains emerged in
China in 2012, circumventing existing vaccines, and RNA
recombination events between wild-type and live-attenuated
PEDV and between avian infectious bronchitis virus (IBV)
strains have seeded new outbreaks23–26. Therefore, measures are
needed to stabilize live-attenuated vaccines against reversion
under selective pressure, particularly for viruses like CoVs, which
employ recombination as a standard feature of their replication
cycle, as incidental recombination events in the context of a co-
infection could unintentionally introduce alleles with enhanced
virulence into an attenuated vaccine genome, with consequences
that could be difficult to predict13,27,28. Several groups, including
our own, have developed novel strategies in fidelity regulation
and control that attenuate RNA virus pathogenesis, and in the
case of CoVs, the development of mutants that prevent reversion
repair to virulence1,29.
Recombination repair is a well-characterized process essential
for genome evolution in many biological systems and plays cri-
tical roles in spread, virulence, and pathogenesis30. In general,
strategies to engineer recombination-resistant RNA viruses have
been limited to CoVs and, to a lesser extent, enteroviruses13,31. In
the context of a CoV infection, recombination occurs when the
viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) switches tem-
plates during nascent RNA synthesis, using the nascent RNA
itself as a primer once the RdRp reassociates with the template
genome. The likelihood of a recombination event occurring is
regulated by several viral factors, including replication rates, RNA
secondary structure, genome size, and the nature of the replicase/
transcriptase protein complex; however, the heritability of a
recombination, once it has occurred, is mediated by the replica-
tion fitness of the resulting progeny genome13,32–35. Several
reports have described the emergence of CoVs with enhanced
virulence that, upon genome analysis, clearly originated from
recombination events of related viruses in avian and mammalian
hosts, including SARS-CoV27,28,36–38. Furthermore, reservoir
species, such as bats, from which the prevailing evidence suggests
that both potentially lethal human CoVs, SARS-CoV and MERS-
CoV, emerged, have been shown to harbor multiple CoV species,
and recombinant RNA genomes have been frequently identified
within colonies and among individual infected animals,
increasing the likelihood of recombination-driven alterations in
species specificity and virulence16,27,39,40.
Thus, engineering elements to render a genome
recombination-refractory is an essential step towards ensuring
that a live-attenuated vaccine candidate cannot regain virulence
during an incidental co-infection with another TRN-compatible
CoV genome. SARS-CoV is a highly pathogenic pneumo-enteric
pathogen that captures many disease features seen among other
CoVs. The TRN conserved sequence (CS) motifs utilized in the
CRG3 and CRG7 backgrounds, CCGGAU and UGGUCGC,
respectively, are both unique sequence motifs when compared
with all known CoV genome TRN sequences, greatly reducing
and likely eliminating the possibility of recombination with
unmodified genomes at the canonical TRS loci. Our previous
work demonstrated that introducing mismatched TRSs was lethal
for RNA recombinant virus replication13. Furthermore, here, we
showed that CRG3 TRN replacement did not revert at the pri-
mary sites of mutation, indicating that the rewired TRN is stable
and not under sufficient selective pressure to revert, even in vivo.
As coordinated interactions are required for TRN function, TRN
reversion is unlikely, given the requirement for nearly simulta-
neous reversions at multiple sites across the genome. Larger-sized
TRS CSs (>7 nts) within the TRN may not prove effective, as
evolution appears to have selected for a CoV RNA polymerase
that is heavily focused on recognizing a 5- to 7-nt TRS CS within
the TRN to regulate subgenomic transcription.
The attenuation resulting from TRN rewiring is most likely
attributed to alterations in the viral transcription profile, low-
abundance transcripts that either encode or reduce the expression
of previously unidentified out-of-frame ORFs, or viral or host
factor interactions with the viral genome. The rewired TRN
produces obvious novel viral RNA species (Supplementary Fig. 4).
These novel RNA species may serve as functional mRNAs, pro-
ducing noncanonical viral protein products that attenuate viral
replication or pathogenesis. Alternatively, these novel RNA spe-
cies may compete with canonical viral RNA species for replica-
tion and transcription, attenuating viral replication and/or
pathogenesis due to the altered availability of transcripts encoding
bona fide viral virulence factors. Furthermore, the rewired TRN
itself may serve as an attenuating factor, as the virus’ dis-
continuous transcription program alters programmed RNA-
protein interactions (involving both viral and host proteins)
either directly (i.e., by altering the bases required for RNA-protein
interactions) or indirectly (i.e., through changes in the RNA’s
secondary structure that affect the steric availability of RNA-
protein interaction sites). Moreover, Di et al., in an arterivirus
model, used next-generation sequencing analysis to show that
noncanonical transcripts are produced in the course of wild-type
infection, indicating that the coding capacity of nidoviruses is
actually much larger than what has been characterized using
Sanger sequencing and biochemical detection methods. Their
findings suggest that attenuation via the TRN may be able to
target noncanonical RNA species, which might be able to impact
pathogenesis with fewer effects on replication and structural
protein production41. These fascinating possibilities will be the
focus of future studies on the mechanism of TRN-related
attenuation.
The hypothesis that alterations in the expression profiles of
canonical viral RNA species and protein products attenuate
pathogenesis is further strengthened when paired with observa-
tions of the types of mutations that were selected upon passage of
CRG3 in aged mice: mutation profiles were different if selection
occurred in young versus aged populations. Frieman et al. pre-
viously demonstrated that mutations in Spike and nonstructural
protein 9 (nsp9) were repetitively selected in several independent
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Fig. 6 Vaccination of aged mice with SARS-CoV CRG7-MA. Weight loss
(depicted as percent initial mass) is shown for aged BALB/ mice vaccinated
with PBS, ExoN-MA (control attenuated virus known to protect in an aged
model) and CRG7-MA and then challenged with a lethal dose of mouse-
adapted SARS-CoV. Vaccinations: PBS, black; ExoN-MA, green; CRG7-MA,
purple. Error bars depict standard deviation
mice, suggesting that Spike–viral receptor interactions and
nsp9–replicase protein interactions were most important for
virulence42. In severely ill SARS-CoV-infected humans (pre-
dominantly over 50 years of age), deletions in and around ORF8
were identified, as discussed earlier16–18,39. Deletions of different
accessory ORFs were the most frequently observed changes after
selection in aged animals. Furthermore, in aged mice, nearly any
combination of 2 SARS-MA15-identified alleles (shown in
Fig. 4a) also conferred increased virulence, most likely reflecting
the increased susceptibility of aged mice to lethal outcomes. These
data suggest that CoV adaptation to virulence is different in
young and aged animals, especially when coupled with variations
in virus pathogenic determinants. While immune senescence can
enhance virus virulence43, our data support the novel hypothesis
that virulent zoonotic coronaviruses may emerge more quickly
after in vivo passage, especially in the aged, where multiple evo-
lutionary pathways exist that can program virus virulence.
The disproportionate identification of mutations in the acces-
sory ORFs following passage of the CRG3 TRN virus in aged
animals may reflect the roles these accessory ORFs are hypo-
thesized to play in the modulation of host immunity44. Aged
animals’ immune systems respond differently, and usually more
severely, to microbial challenge, with the immune response
skewed towards severe innate immune effects and defects in
adaptive immunity45. However, in the context of CoV infection,
this augmented immune response, when presented in the context
of accessory ORF deletion, may serve as a virulence fulcrum, with
the balance poised between essential immune recognition and
severe disease, possibly due to defects in spread and persistence.
These potential effects on host immunity argue that a stable
vaccine candidate should consider the potential for changes in
accessory ORFs.
A well-designed vaccine candidate should include genetic traps
that are either independently attenuating or triggered by
recombination events. We have previously demonstrated both
stable attenuation and protection against lethal challenge with
inactivations of the nsp14 exonuclease1 and the nsp16 2′-O-
methyltransferase46 activities. In addition, Züst et al. demon-
strated that a partial deletion of the murine hepatitis virus (MHV)
nsp1 replicase protein could protect against homologous and
heterologous challenge47. Combining alleles that render the virus
recombination-refractory, alter RNA replication fidelity, and that
result in an altered host immune response could produce stable,
reversion-proof, live-attenuated viruses that induce robust neu-
tralizing immunity. Attenuating alleles, coupled with a rewired
TRN, are anticipated to increase the stability of the attenuation
and to minimize the chances for RNA recombination repair. The
strategies reported herein, coupled with the availability of new
molecular clones for CoVs that cause severe disease in livestock
populations, provide a vehicle for improved live virus vaccine
design48–53. It may also be possible to “tune” the CoV TRN, with
attenuating changes concentrated on virulence alleles, such as
accessory genes known to impact pathogenesis. Such alterations
have the potential to greater enhance the stability of a vaccine
candidate, particularly if considering TRS context outside of the
5- to 7-nt core sequence. Such studies would benefit the most if
the RNA structure is also considered, as TRS accessibility is most
likely modulated by structural elements in the CoV RNA genome.
Such studies will be the focus of future work.
With the continuing identification of zoonotic pools of CoVs
that genetically resemble lethal human and animal CoVs, often
with only a few percentage points of difference between the
zoonotic and lethal human sequences10,54–57, the necessity for a
rapidly implementable, universal attenuation platform for CoV
live-attenuated vaccine design is underscored. In this report, we
described the design and implementation of a CoV attenuation
strategy that can be easily and rapidly adapted to any CoV gen-
ome. The presence of 8–9 characterized TRSs within any CoV
genome, the CSs of which are 6–7 nts each, offers too large and
complex a target for primary site reversion to be a likely event. As
most single recombination events would decouple TRN expres-
sion networks, these recombinants would be lethal. Therefore,
this attenuation strategy, when paired with alleles that can resist
selection events that lead to second-site reversion, could bring
live-attenuated CoV vaccines within the reach of realization in
the face of the ever-growing threat of new human and animal
CoV-based epidemics.
Methods
Viruses and cells. All virus stocks were propagated in Vero-E6 cells as described
in58. All virus work was performed in a biological safety cabinet in a biosafety level
3 laboratory.
Construction of SARS plasmids and viruses. TRN3-based plasmids were con-
structed in13. TRN7 mutations were introduced into SARS plasmids A and F using
cassettes generated by BioBasic. To generate SARS-F plasmids containing both
TRN mutations and the mouse-adapted mutation at nt 2663, the mouse-adapted
mutation was cloned into the F TRN plasmids via a PCR and restriction digestion
strategy. To generate SARS-F plasmids containing both TRN mutations and the
mouse-adapted mutation at nt 2663, the mouse-adapted mutation was cloned into
the F TRN plasmids via a PCR and restriction digestion strategy. The plasmids F-
BstZ (5′-GGAGGCGCAATTTTTGTACCTCTATGCCTTG-3′), R-MAmut (5′-
AGCTATCGTCTCCGCTTCTCAACGGTAATAGTACCGTTGTCTG-3′), F-
MAmut (5′-AGCTATCGTCTCCAAGCTTAAACAACTCCTGGAACAA
TGGAAC-3′), and R-Msc (5′-GTGGCTTAGCTACTTCGTTGCTTCCTT
CAGGC-3′) were used to generate 2 amplicons. The resulting amplicons were
restriction-digested with BsmB I, ligated, and purified, after which the ligated
amplicons and the parent vectors were restriction-digested with BstZ17 I and Msc I
and ligated. Ligated vectors were transformed into TopTen E. coli cells, and the
resulting colonies were screened and sequence-verified. Viruses were then con-
structed as described in ref. 58.
Northern blot analysis. Intracellular RNA was isolated using RiboPure reagents
(Ambion, Austin, TX) 12 h post-infection13. The mRNA was then isolated using a
Qiagen Oligotex mRNA isolation kit, treated with glyoxal, and separated an
agarose gel using NorthernMax-Gly (Ambion). The RNA was then transferred to
BrightStar-Plus membrane (Ambion) for 5 h, cross-linked using UV light, pre-
hybridized, and probed with an N gene-specific oligonucleotide probe (5′-
CTTGACTGCCGCCTCTGCTbTbCCCTbCTbGCb-3′; biotinylated nucleotides are
denoted with a superscripted “b”). The blot was hybridized overnight and washed
with low- and high-stringency buffers and was then incubated with phosphatase-
conjugated streptavidin. The blot was then incubated with CDP-STAR, overlaid
with film, and developed.
Mouse infections with SARS-CoV and mutants. All experimental protocols
involving mice were reviewed and approved by the institutional animal care and
use committee at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA. The
following mice were used: 10-week-old female BALB/c (Charles River Laboratories,
Wilmington, MA, USA) and 14-month-old female BALB/c (Harlan Laboratories,
Indianapolis, IN, USA). Mice were lightly anesthetized and infected intranasally
with varying doses (102–106 PFU, depending on the experiment) of SARS-CoV,
MA15, or TRN mutants. Mice were weighed daily, and on certain days specified in
each experiment, mouse lungs were harvested for virus titer and/or RNA. Serial
passages were inoculated as above for passage 1; subsequent passages were
inoculated with 50 μL of clarified lung homogenate (lungs were homogenized in 1
mL of PBS) from the previous passage. All experiments used a minimum of n= 5
mice per virus per dosage/condition (if applicable) per timepoint. For
infection–challenge studies, mice were infected with 102–103 PFU of the indicated
vaccine virus, weighed for the 7 days following initial infection, and then chal-
lenged with a lethal dose (106 PFU) of MA15 for the challenge infection.
Determination of virus titer in infected mouse lungs. Lungs harvested for virus
titer were weighed and homogenized in 1.0 mL of PBS at 6000 rpm for 60 s in a
MagnaLyser (Roche, Basel, Switzerland). Virus titers were determined by plaque
assay on Vero cells.
Determination of viral neutralization antibody titers. Mouse sera were heat-
inactivated for 30 min at 55 °C and were then serially diluted to 1:100, 1:200, 1:400,
1:800, and 1:1600 in PBS to a volume of 125 μL. Next, 125 μL of PBS containing
low-concentration SARS-CoV MA15 (40 PFU) or high-concentration SARS-CoV
MA15 (240 PFU) was added to each serum dilution. The virus-serum mixtures
were incubated at 37 °C for 30 min. Following incubation, virus titers of the
mixtures were determined by plaque assay. Finally, we calculated the 50% plaque
reduction neutralization titer (PRNT50) values, the serum dilutions at which plaque
formation was reduced by 50% relative to that of virus stock not treated with
serum.
Viral genome sequencing. To determine the sequences of viral genomes present
in mouse lungs after passage, plaques were isolated from lung samples as described
above. Briefly, individual viral plaques were harvested by collecting the agarose
plugs above them using a 200-μL pipette tip. Each agarose plug was dropped in 0.5
mL PBS, allowed to diffuse for 24 h at 4 °C, and then applied to ~70% confluent
monolayers of Vero-E6 cells in T25 flasks and incubated for 48 h at 37 °C. Infected
cell monolayers were then harvested in 1 mL of TRIzol. First-strand cDNA was
generated as described in ref. 59. Amplicons of the viral genomes were generated as
described in ref. 1. Sequence results were analyzed using Geneious R11 (Biomatters,
Auckland, New Zealand) and Serial Cloner 2.6.1 (SerialBasics, http://serialbasics.
free.fr/Home/Home.html).
Statistical analyses. Statistical analyses were performed using GraphPad Prism 7
(GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA, USA). The tests run depended on the experi-
mental design and are specified in the text. Significance was set at P < 0.05.
Data availability
The viral genome sequence datasets are available via the NCBI GenBank with accession
identifiers MK062179 through MK062184. All other data generated during and/or
analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on rea-
sonable request.
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